Usage of a random eff ects panel logit model have shown in this paper that the high propensity to pay dividends by the state-controlled companies quoted on the Warsaw Stock Exchange over the last years was not a result of the tunneling eff ect but was the maturity eff ect. The state-controlled companies which pay dividends fulfi l the maturity eff ect criteria as they are big, profi table, have low investment opportuniti es and fi nancial leverage, and are characterised by low risk associated with investi ng in their shares. The additi onal evidence of a reasonable and stable dividend policy pursued by the state-controlled companies are: payout rati o on the level of slightly more than 50% and lower by almost 8 percentage points than in the other companies; and relati vely rare use of the reserve capital for dividends. However, state-controlled companies listed on the WSE are mostly commercial and of a fi scal nature for the state, which may create a temptati on for tunneling.
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I
Studies of developed and emerging capital markets show that one of the basic factors determining the propensity to pay dividends is the maturity eff ect (Grullon et al., 2002; DeAngelo et al., 2006) . Mature companies are usually stable, big (in terms of employment, income, and value of assets), profi table, and with a growing free cash fl ow which exceeds their investment needs so they are more willing to pay dividends than less mature companies (Jensen, 1986) .
The maturity eff ect itself can be explained in basic fi nancial theories connected with dividend policy. According to the lifecycle theory of dividends, a company starts to pay them out when it has passed from a high growth rate to a low growth rate, in other words -from the immaturity to the maturity phase in its life cycle (Damodaran, 2007 (Damodaran, , p. 1022 ).
According to the agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) along the process of company maturati on grows the agency confl ict and the company should pay dividends in order to reduce the confl ict. It is parti cularly strong in state-controlled companies, where a double principalagent problem exists and only a high and conti nuous stream of paid dividends can solve it (Gugler, 2003 (Gugler, , p. 1301 ).
Yet recent studies of emerging markets, especially in the case of China, have shown that the high propensity to pay dividends and high level of dividend payments by companies controlled by the state are a result of tunnelling, extracti on of cash from the fi rms by the state, which is called a tunneling eff ect (Li, Chen & Chen, 2013) .
The Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) is an emerging market. In 2013 there were only 15 companies listed there which were directly controlled by the state (3.7% of the total amount of listed domesti c companies), but the capitalisati on of these companies accounted for 39% of the capitalizati on of the whole Polish stock market and their share in dividend payments reached 56.5%. In 2013 the propensity to pay dividends by state-controlled companies was two and half ti mes higher (73.3%), than in the other companies (31%) .
The questi on arises then: whether such a high propensity to pay dividends by the companies controlled by the Polish government was the result of the maturity eff ect or whether it was due to the tunneling eff ect caused by the budget problems of those days.
To answer the above questi on, a random eff ects panel logit model of the propensity to pay dividends with diff erent proxies of maturity as explanatory variables was esti mated, using data from the years 1996-2009. This model became a tool for forecasts of dividends payments by the state-controlled companies in 2013. A low accuracy of forecasts would have meant that the maturity factors had no infl uence on propensity and the other factors, including tunneling, determined the dividend decision of the state-controlled companies. A high accuracy of forecasts would have testi fi ed in favour of the maturity eff ect.
The obtained results tended to confi rm that the state-controlled companies listed on the WSE are more likely to pay higher dividends because they meet the criteria of the maturity eff ect and not because the state, as the owner, uses tunneling to deprive the companies of free cash fl ow which is instead used for the current acti viti es of the state.
The rest of the arti cle is organised in such a way that the second chapter presents a review of the literature on the results of research on the propensity to pay dividends by state-controlled companies in selected countries. The third secti on discusses the adopted methodology. The fourth presents the data used in the analysis, while the fi ft h chapter presents the results of the study and formulates the answer to the questi on here.
L e agency explanation of maturity e ect
The problem of costs and agency confl icts occurs when management has too much cash. There is a risk that this money may be ineffi ciently invested, which could become a root of a confl ict between the management and the minority shareholders. Payment of dividends reduces the level of the agency confl ict between the board of directors and shareholders (Easterbrook, 1984, p. 652 ).
Agency problems do not occur in small, immature companies because: 1) they have so many eff ecti ve investment opportuniti es that their growth is bringing increasing profi ts; both shareholders and managers are happy, 2) they have to raise external capital, which means "e-Finanse" 2015, vol. 11 / nr 4 Mieczysław Kowerski High propensity to pay dividends by state-controlled companies in Poland. Tunneling or maturity e ect? that they are monitored by banks and other insti tuti ons, 3) entrepreneurs and managers have signifi cant shares. Therefore, their interests coincide with the interests of the remaining shareholders.
But, as the companies mature, the agency confl icts grow. Therefore, they should pay dividends. Mature companies are usually stable, big (in terms of employment, income, and value of assets), profi table, with a growing free cash fl ow exceeding investment needs (Jensen, 1986) . Quite oft en the boards of such companies are tempted to waste resources by using them for their own needs (salary, bonuses, unprofi table investments). DeAngelo et al. (2006, p. 250, 252) characterised the confl ict based on free cash fl ow as a confl ict associated with the retenti on of profi ts and found that it occurred within mature companies. Therefore, the opti mal dividend policy of such companies should rely on reducing unprofi table or weakly profi table investments in order to increase dividend payments.
Empirical verifi cati on of the maturity eff ect was conducted by Grullon et al. (2002, p. 396) . They confi rmed that along with maturati on, investment (growth) opportuniti es of companies decrease, causing a reducti on in capital spending. Thus, more resources remain available for the payment of dividends.
At the stage of maturity, the company's ability to generate free cash fl ow outweighs the possibility of fi nding profi table investment projects. The opti mal soluti on for such companies is the payment of cash in the form of dividends.
Studies of developed and emerging capital markets show that the state-controlled companies have a higher propensity to pay dividends, which are more frequent than in the other groups of companies paying high dividends. The state-controlled companies quoted on stock exchanges are usually mature (La Porta et al., 1999; Truang & Heaney, 2007; Adamczyk, 2014) . Sti ll, according to several authors there is an additi onal explanati on of high propensity to pay dividends -a double principalagent confl ict. The citi zens are the ulti mate owners of the state-controlled companies. However, they do not control them directly. Their elected representati ves do (or should do) this. The citi zens cede their control functi ons to the politi cians, who quite oft en represent the interests of their party and not the society as a whole. In additi on to the traditi onal confl ict between the management and the politi cians (the government) controlling the company, there arises an additi onal confl ict between the politi cians and the ulti mate owners (the citi zens). Only high and conti nuously paid dividends can convince the fi nal owners (the citi zens) that the company is functi oning properly (Gugler, 2003 (Gugler, , p. 1301 ).
e tunneling e ect
The term "tunnelling" refers to the transfer of resources out of a company to its controlling shareholder (Johnson et al., 2000, p. 23) . The tunneling can take the form of salary transfer, subsidised personal loans, nonarms-length asset transacti ons and -in some casesoutright theft (Johnson et al., 2000, p. 24) . In the opinion of some authors, parti cularly in the emerging markets, payments of high dividends by the state-controlled companies are of the same character. Chinese studies have shown that the high propensity to pay dividends and the high level of those payments by the companies controlled by the state are a result of tunneling or extracti on of cash from fi rms (Li, Chen & Chen, 2013 ).
In the case of dividends, the tunneling eff ect can be explained by the fact of the state fi rst introducing att racti ve enterprises on the stock market and then being eager to reap the benefi ts (Lam, Sami & Zhou, 2012, p. 214) . These are both received from dividends as well as from the taxes payed by the other shareholders (Wang, Manry & Wandler, 2011, p. 368) . Among the variety of the forms of tunneling, the dividend payment might be one of the means of legal tunneling. This is contrary to the opinion that a cash dividend may alleviate the agency problem between the majority shareholder and minority shareholders (Lee & Xiao, 2004, p. 17) .
Special att enti on should be drawn to the socalled post-socialist countries, where previously almost exclusively state-owned companies functi oned. These companies are gradually being privati sed, although the state sector sti ll bears great importance. The best example here is China. The stock exchanges formed in 1990 in Shenzhen, and in 1991 in Shanghai, according to some were created by the government as a tool ("vehicle") for fundraising by the state-owned enterprises. In 2010, despite the decline in recent years, the direct and indirect parti cipati on of the Chinese state in companies listed on Chinese stock exchanges was 59.9% (Li, Chen & Chen 2013, p. 4) .
Other examples could be the former socialist states "e-Finanse" 2015, vol. 11 / nr 4 Mieczysław Kowerski High propensity to pay dividends by state-controlled companies in Poland. Tunneling or maturity e ect? of Central Europe. According to the Deloitt e CE TOP 500 ranking (2014) of 2013, amongst the 500 largest manufacturing-services companies (banks and insurance companies were not included in the surveys) of Central Europe and Ukraine less than 19% remain under the control of the state. But they create the 30% of the revenue of all the largest companies from the region. They are mostly companies in so-called strategic sectors (energy, petroleum, transport and public uti liti es). The leader is PKN ORLEN (Poland) and in the twenty largest state companies of the region there are 12 companies from Poland (Adamczyk, 2014, pp. 18-19) . These companies may potenti ally be a subject of tunneling.
e results of the selected studies on state-controlled dividend policy
The research of dividend policies of the statecontrolled companies most frequently sought to answer questi ons such as whether these companies are more likely to pay dividends than others (have a higher propensity to pay) and whether the payout level of these companies is higher than in the case of companies with other owners. The questi on of the propensity to pay dividends was most commonly solved by means of qualitati ve response models with a dependent variable adopti on of the value of 1 if the company was paying a dividend and a value of 0 in the opposite situati on. In a set of explanatory (independent) variables there was a variable adopti ng a value of 1 if the state was the control shareholder of the company, and a value of 0 in the opposite situati on, or a variable that described the percentage of the state share in the company's capital. To esti mate the parameters of such models a logit approach was most commonly used. The fi rst logit models used to study the propensity to pay dividends were proposed by Fama and French (2001) . They also suggested three main factors infl uencing the dividend paying decision (size, profi tability and investment opportuniti es of the company).
Questi ons about the level of payment were most oft en analysed using Lintner's parti al adjustment model (Lintner, 1956) , in which the profi t in the year t and the dividend in the year t-1 were applied as the explanatory variables of a dividend in the year t. Gugler (2003) analysed 214 companies between 1991 and 1999, selected from the largest Austrian companies, including 45 state-controlled enti ti es. To analyse the level of payments he applied the Lintner model "enriched" with a 0 -1 explanatory variable (DST) adopti ng a value of 1 when the state was the largest shareholder, and of 0 when otherwise. The esti mated value of a coeffi cient on the DST variable was positi ve and stati sti cally signifi cant, which meant that the statecontrolled companies payed higher dividends. The author also esti mated two basic characteristi cs of the Lintner model: (1) the target payout rati o, which amounted up to 42.9% for state-controlled companies (the highest and stati sti cally signifi cantly higher than the target payout rati o for the remaining analysed groups of companies) and (2) the smoothing rati o, that was also the highest for state-controlled companies among the analysed groups of companies (Gugler, 2003 (Gugler, , p. 1314 . This meant that the Austrian state-controlled companies not only payed the highest dividends, but also tried to "smooth" them and paid dividends on a regular basis, with similar values. The author also esti mated a logit model in which a dependent variable took the value of 1 if the company lowered the dividend in year t compared with the year t-1, and of 0 if otherwise. The coeffi cient on the variable describing the involvement of the state within the company was negati ve (although stati sti cally insignifi cant), which confi rmed the reluctance of the state-controlled companies to reduce dividends (Gugler, 2003 (Gugler, , pp. 1315 (Gugler, -1316 .
Similar research was carried out by Szilagyi and Renneboog for Dutch companies (2008) . They analysed 150 non-fi nancial companies listed for at least 3 years on Euronext Amsterdam or the newer Dutch market NMAX in the years 1996 -2006 (a total of 962 observati ons). These companies represented more than 2/3 of all companies quoted on stock exchanges in Amsterdam, and their market capitalisati on was 90% of the capitalisati on for these exchanges. In the esti mated models the coeffi cients on the variable describing the parti cipati ons of the state in the companies' capitalizati on were positi ve, which would confi rm the hypothesis that a higher fracti on of shares belonging to the state means the higher propensity to pay dividends and a higher level of payoff . Sti ll, these coeffi cients were found to be stati sti cally insignifi cant, which weakened the formulated proposals.
The logit models of the dividend decision esti mated by Truong and Heaney (2007) on the basis of observati ons coming from 37 countries in 2004 (8279) proved that outside the United States the companies with a large (at least 5%) involvement of the state are more likely to pay
dividends than other companies. Lam et al. (2012) collected data from 1712 Chinese companies quoted in the years 2001 -2006, primarily on stock exchanges in Shenzhen and Shanghai, but also on the exchanges in Hong Kong, New York, London and Singapore (7519 observati ons). Using these data, they built a linear model of a dividend payout rati o with variables describing the size of the companies, their debt, profi tability, cash, investment opportuniti es, risk of investi ng in shares of the company (measured by the beta coeffi cient) and also the ownership structure; the state involvement was measured by the fracti on of the state shares in a company's total capitalisati on. In the esti mated linear regression model of the dividend payout rati o, the coeffi cient on the ownership structure variable was positi ve and signifi cant: the greater fracti on of shares belonging to the state in the company was, the higher the dividend payout rati o became. Wang et al. (2011, p. 369-371) analysed 4864 observati ons from companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange between 1998 and 2008 which paid dividends over at least two succeeding years. In the esti mated logit models of the dividend decision coeffi cient on the variable describing the fact of state control (x = 1) or the lack of it (x = 0) was positi ve and stati sti cally signifi cant, indicati ng that the state-controlled companies had a higher propensity to pay dividends. Also, the Lintner model "enriched" by a 0-1 explanatory variable describing the control of the company by the state showed that the value of the dividend per share is higher in the case of a company controlled by the Chinese state.
These research fi ndings indicate that both in the developed and emerging markets state-controlled companies have a higher propensity to pay dividends than the other companies. In the case of developed markets, state-controlled companies also try to "smooth out" dividends so that they do not change their value regardless of fi nancial performance.
M
To answer the questi on as to whether the higher propensity to pay dividends by the companies listed on the WSE with state shares as of 2013 was a result of "tunneling" by the state, or whether it was due to the eff ect of maturity a two-stage procedure was applied.
During the fi rst stage, a random eff ect panel model (Maddala, 2006, pp. 645-648) of the propensity to pay dividends by domesti c public companies' quoted on the WSE in the years 1995-2009 was proposed: ,
where:
-unobserved propensity to pay dividends for i-th company in the year t,
-[(k+1) x 1] vector of values on k explanatory variables (plus constant term) for the i-th company in the year t-1.
, (2) The opti mal set of explanatory variables was found with the stepwise regression method. This opti mal set embraced diff erent proxies of maturity and control variables.
-vector of coeffi cients -random individual eff ect for the i-th company A propensity to pay dividends is not directly observed, however we can assume that if it exceeds a certain threshold C (cutpoint), the company will pay dividend. Otherwise, it will not pay (Owczarczuk, 2012, p. 65 
-dependent variable taking value 1 if i-th company in t year paid the dividend and value 0 if otherwise.
Then, the random eff ects panel logit model (Cameron & Trivedi, 2013, pp. 360-364) , was esti mated: ,
-logarithm of odds rati o (probability of paying dividend divided by the probability of not paying dividend)
-disturbance term with the standardised logisti c distributi on.
It is assumed the lack of correlati on between "e-Finanse" 2015, vol. 11 / nr 4 Mieczysław Kowerski High propensity to pay dividends by state-controlled companies in Poland. Tunneling or maturity e ect? distributi ons of α i , and ε i,t for i-th observati on and with explanatory variables (Witkowski, 2012, p. 301 ).
The formulated model is esti mated with the maximum likelihood method.
The existence of specifi c random eff ects was verifi ed with the LR test. The signifi cance of each coeffi cient was verifi ed by z stati sti cs with N (0 ; 1) distributi on. The signifi cance of the whole set of explanatory variables was verifi ed by the Wald test. The assessment of the measure of goodness of fi t was performed using the McFadden determinati on coeffi cient pseudo R 2 (Maddala, 2006, p. 378) .
The specifi ed model allows for calculati ng the probability of dividend payout by a company i in a given year t (assuming that the individual random eff ect is equal to 0):
, (5) where:
b -vector of esti mated values of vector of coeffi cient.
During the second stage, the forecasts of the probabiliti es to pay dividends were esti mated, using the assessed model and the data of explanatory variables for state-controlled companies in 2012. Due to the fact that the sample used for the esti mati on of the model was disproporti onate (unbalanced) and the observati ons concerning dividend payouts consti tuted 30.6%, the fi tt ed values of calculated probabiliti es of dividend payouts may be underesti mated (Gruszczyński, 2002, p. 80) . In the case of the knowledge of the fracti on of dividend payers in general populati on the special correcti on of fi tt ed probabiliti es can be applied (King & Zeng, 2001, p. 144) but we do not know this "true value". This is why the following procedure of forecasti ng has been proposed:
Because the explanatory variables are diff erent proxies of maturity, low accuracy of forecast means that the maturity factors have no signifi cant infl uence on propensity to pay dividends. Thus, other factors (including tunneling) determined the dividend decision of state-controlled companies. The high accuracy of forecast testi fi es in favour of maturity eff ects.
D
The random eff ects panel logit model was esti mated on the data from the domesti c companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange in [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . Only the companies whose shares were listed for the enti re year before the year of the dividend decision were taken into account. The set of domesti c companies listed for the enti re year did not include nati onal investment funds, due to a diff erent method of fi nancial accounts. The set also did not comprise companies with negati ve values of own equity and companies with zero revenue from sales of products, services, goods and materials (companies which did not conduct operati onal acti viti es in a given year). The set comprised companies which were listed during the enti re analysed period (whole ti meframe) and companies which were quoted only during a subperiod due to the fact that they became available on the stock exchange later or (and) they were excluded from it or in some sub-periods did not meet the qualifi cati on criteria for the set (for example they had negati ve own equity). Thus, an unbalanced panel was obtained. It was composed of 399 companies within 14 years consisti ng of 2,263 observati ons -companies-years (observati ons per group: min = 1, avg = 5,67, max = 14).
The set of explanatory variables was chosen with the stepwise regression method from 85 variables describing the economic and fi nancial situati on of analysed companies and macroeconomic variables describing the economic situati on of Poland.
At the end of 2013, 20 companies were listed on the WSE in which the state (Minister of Treasury and Minister of Economy) was a direct shareholder. Only in 15 companies the amount of state shares exceeded 27.5%, allowing a direct control of the state of these companies. In the three other companies the state was a minority shareholder, while the two remaining were indirectly state-controlled by using other directly controlled companies.
The subject of further, detailed study will be 15 companies listed on the stock exchange in Warsaw which are directly controlled by the state. At the end of 2013, these companies were admitt edly only 3.7% of all domesti c companies listed, but their capitalisati on amounted to 231.9 bln PLN, representi ng 39.1% of the capitalizati on of the whole stock market. In 2013, dividends were paid by 11 state-controlled companies (73.3% of all statecontrolled companies) and 125 other companies (31.0% of other companies). But the value of dividends paid by "e-Finanse" 2015, vol. 11 / nr 4 Mieczysław Kowerski High propensity to pay dividends by state-controlled companies in Poland. Tunneling or maturity e ect? companies controlled by the state in 2013 amounted to 11.0 bln PLN, representi ng 56.5% of all dividends. The state-controlled companies that paid dividends tended to have a 7.9 percentage point lower payout rati o than other companies, but a 1.4 percentage point higher dividend yield rati o.
R
The applied stepwise regression method permitt ed us to fi nd the opti mal set of 10 explanatory variables. All esti mated coeffi cients of random eff ects panel logit model were signifi cant on the level of 0.05. According to the Wald test the whole set of explanatory variables was signifi cant. According to the LR test specifi c random eff ects existed within the studied panel data, so the panel logit model with specifi c random eff ects was a proper tool of esti mati on.
The esti mated values and signs of coeffi cients on explanatory variables show that the maturity eff ect was the main factor of the decisions to pay dividends by the companies quoted on the WSE in the years 1995-2009. Companies which had been more profi table, bigger, older, with lower investment opportuniti es and fi nancial leverage, characterised by lower risk associated with investi ng in their shares and which had paid a dividend in the previous year (t-1) were more prone to decide to * if a company pays a dividend only from its net profi t in the last accounti ng period: profi t for distributi on = net profi t; if a company pays a dividend using (additi onally or only) retained earnings (non-distributed profi ts for previous years): profi t for distributi on = net profi t + retained earnings used for dividends; if a company noted a loss in the last accounti ng period: profi t for distributi on = retained earnings used for dividends. **relati on of dividend to profi t for distributi on Source: Own calculati ons "e-Finanse" 2015, vol. 11 / nr 4 Mieczysław Kowerski High propensity to pay dividends by state-controlled companies in Poland. Tunneling or maturity e ect? pay dividends in year t. Banks were more likely to pay dividends than other companies. Companies were more prone to pay out dividends in periods of a more profi table dividend tax policy.
The probabiliti es of dividend payments in 2013 for 13 state-controlled companies 1 were esti mated, using the model and taking the explanatory variables values of companies controlled by the state in 2012.
Only for 1 company the probability of payout was less than 0.306, which indicated that only this company would have not paid a dividend. In 2013, out of the 13 analysed companies, two did not pay dividends. The forecast was not correct only in the case of one company (LOTOS) which did not pay a dividend in spite of the probability calculated on the basis of the model exceeding 0.306. The total accuracy of predicti ons was 92.3%.
These calculati ons indicate that the analysed 1 Two companies were not analyzed because shares were not listed for enti re year of 2012 companies pay dividends not because their owner is the state, but because they meet the criteria of mature companies (they fulfi l the maturity eff ect), because they are: 1) bigger -in 2012, the state-controlled companies had a capitalizati on which was almost six ti mes higher than other companies, 2) much less risky -in 2012, the risk quoti ent measure of the diff erence between maximum and minimum prices to the minimum price for the state-controlled companies was about 1/3 less than for other companies, 3) more profi table -in 2012, only 1 company controlled by the state (7.7% of those analysed) suff ered a loss, while in the other categories, more than 30% of the companies had a loss. The return on equiti es of statecontrolled companies is more than 40% higher than other companies making profi ts, 4) devoid of large investment opportuniti escapitalisati on to the value of equity rati o in 2012 for state- controlled companies was 12.6% less than for the others, 5) mature -in the sense of stock capital to equity rati o, 6) burdened with lower fi nancial leverage.
C
The presented results of the calculati ons tend to conclude that the state-controlled companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange are more likely to pay higher dividends because they meet the criteria of the maturity eff ect and not because the state as owner uses tunneling to deprive them of free cash fl ow which is used up for the current acti vity of the government. A payout rati o which is lower by almost 8 percentage points from the other companies and only slightly more than 50%, as well as the relati vely rare use of the reserve capital for dividends (Kowerski, 2013, pp. 281-285 ) is evidence of a reasonable and stable dividend policy pursued by the state-controlled companies. Thus, the answer to the questi on formulated in the introducti on to this paper is: "High propensity to pay dividends by companies controlled by the Polish government was the result of the eff ect of maturity". However, it should be noted that the state-controlled companies listed on the WSE (except in the energy and fuel sectors) do not carry out tasks directly connected with state security but are commercial companies, having a fi scal nature for the state. This, perhaps, also helps in creati ng economic policies that might actually create the temptati on of tunneling. Therefore, a close watch should be kept on the acti ons of the state-controlled companies in terms of dividend policy. 
